gulf of tonkin conspiracy

The U.S. Navy stressed that the two technically were not in communication with one another, but the distinction was irrelevant to the North Vietnamese. In 1964 the Navy was attempting to determine the extent of North Vietnams maritime infiltration into the South and to identify the Norths coastal defenses so that Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) could better support South Vietnams commando operations against the North. Two days later, August 4, Maddox returned to the area, supported by the destroyer Turner Joy (DD-951). The lack of success in SOGs missions during the first few months of 1964 made this proposal quite attractive. Hisfirst ship was USS Glennon (DD-840), a FRAM I destroyer, thesame class as Maddox. Aircraft from Ticonderoga arrived on-scene at 1528 hours and fired on the boats. 1, Vietnam 1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 611. Senator Morse was one of the dissenters. If there had been any doubt before about whose hand was behind the raids, surely there was none now. Case Closed: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - HistoryNet This article by Capt. U.S. and South Vietnamese warships intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and simultaneously shelled: Hon Nieu Island, 4 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province [and] Hon Me Island, 12 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province." The House passed the resolution unanimously.17 WebTo many online conspiracy theorists, the biggest false flag operation of all time was the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Moving in closer, the crew could see their targeta communications towersilhouetted in the moonlight. Gulf of Tonkin incident - Wikipedia Under the operational control of Captain John J. Herrick, it steamed through the Gulf of Tonkin collecting intelligence. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 When you visit the site, Dotdash Meredith and its partners may store or retrieve information on your browser, mostly in the form of cookies. Naval Institute. The World is a public radio program that crosses borders and time zones to bring home the stories that matter. (2021, February 16). The truth about 'False Flags' from Nazi Germany to the Vietnam War Interpretation by historians as to what exactly did and did not occur during those few days in early August 1964 remains so varied that the wonder is that authors Marolda and Fitzgerald were able themselves to settle on the text. Perhaps that is the most enduring lesson from Americas use of SIGINT in the Vietnam War in general and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in particular. That night and morning, while cruising in heavy weather, the ships received radar, radio, and sonar reports that signaled another North Vietnamese attack. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. But the administration dithered, informing the embassy only that "further OPLAN 34A operations should be held off pending review of the situation in Washington. As Communist communications activity was rising rapidly, American senior leaders were increasing support to the South Vietnamese government. What really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964? Both sides, however, spent August 3 reviewing their contingency plans and analyzing lessons learned from the incident. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt, agreed and suggested that a U.S. Navy ship could be used to vector 34A boats to their targets.6. The threat removed, Maddox retired from the area to rejoin friendly forces. He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." His assessment of the evidence now raised doubts in his mind about what really had happened. Both the Phu Bai station and Maddoxs DSU knew the boats had orders to attack an enemy ship., Not knowing about the South Vietnamese commando raid, all assumed that Maddox was the target. Then, everyones doubts were swept away when a SIGINT intercept from one of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats reported the claim that it had shot down two American planes in the battle area. He spoke out against banning girls education. The bullets struck the destroyer; the torpedo missed. The electronic intercept traffic cited here is too voluminous to permit a conclusion that somehow everything was the figment of the collective imaginations on both sides. In the end the Navy agreed, and in concert with MACV, took steps to ensure that "34A operations will be adjusted to prevent interference" with Desoto patrols.7 This did not mean that MACV did not welcome the information brought back by the Desoto patrols, only that the two missions would not actively support one another. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution - Definition, Cause & Significance Oklahoma City Bombing. One 12.7mm machine bullet hit Maddox before the boats broke off and started to withdraw. Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. In the future, conventional operations would receive all the attention. Cookies collect information about your preferences and your devices and are used to make the site work as you expect it to, to understand how you interact with the site, and to show advertisements that are targeted to your interests. Our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. In fact, an earlier Desoto patrol planned for February had been canceled because of concerns over potential interference with South Vietnamese commando missions scheduled for the same time. That night, on national television, Johnson addressedthe American people, saying,Renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to take action and reply. In 1996 Edward Moises book Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War presented the first publicly released concrete evidence that the SIGINT reporting confirmed the August 2 attack, but not the alleged second attack of August 4. The Taliban silenced him. Originally begun by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, 34A was a highly-classified program of covert operations against North Vietnam. As the torpedo boats continued their high-speed approach, Maddox was ordered to fire warning shots if they closed inside 10,000 yards. THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND THE VIETNAM CONFLICT Volume II: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 By Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald Government Printing Office for The Naval Historical Center 591 pp. The string of intelligence mistakes, mistranslations, misinterpretations and faulty decision making that occurred in the Tonkin Gulf in 1964 reveals how easily analysts and officials can jump to the wrong conclusions and lead a nation into war. . Senator Wayne Morse (D-OR) challenged the account, and argued that despite evidence that 34A missions and Desoto patrols were not operating in tandem, Hanoi could only have concluded that they were. The Gulf of Tonkin act became more controversial as opposition to the war mounted. One element of American assistance to South Vietnam included covert support for South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnams coastal transportation facilities and networks. Johnsonasked for, and received, a resolution of war from the US Congress that led to further escalation in the conflict. This was the first of several carefully worded official statements aimed at separating 34A and Desoto and leaving the impression that the United States was not involved in the covert operations.9 (The recent NBC television movie In Love and War had Navy pilot James B. Stockdale flying over the scene at the time saying, "I see nothing"; now a retired vice admiral, Stockdale has reiterated the "phoney attack" charge in writings and public speaking.). He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, Americas Last Vietnam Battle (Hippocrene Books, 1994), and Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington Books, 1990). But in the pre-dawn hours of July 31, 1964, U.S.-backed patrol boats shelled two North When the enemy boats closed to less than 10,000 yards, the destroyer fired three shots across the bow of the lead vessel. PRX is a 501(c)(3) organization recognized by the IRS: #263347402. In the first few days of August 1964, a series of events off the coast of North Vietnam and decisions made in Washington, D.C., set the United States on a course that would largely define the next decade and weigh heavily on American foreign policy to this day. The USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin is shown in 1963. This explanation held briefly, long enough for President Johnson -- admittedly not inclined to engage in what might be called oververification -- to rush the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution through Congress. No actual visual sightings by Maddox.". 5. There remains some disagreement among historians about the second (Aug. 4) incident, which involved the Maddox and another destroyer, the USS Turner Joy. A lesser-known fact is that Jim Morrisons father, Captain George Stephen Morrison, commanded the Carrier Division during the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. This was almost certainly a reaction to the recent 34A raids. You can find out more about our use, change your default settings, and withdraw your consent at any time with effect for the future by visiting Cookies Settings, which can also be found in the footer of the site. "I think we are kidding the world if you try to give the impression that when the South Vietnamese naval boats bombarded two islands a short distance off the coast of North Vietnam we were not implicated," he scornfully told McNamara during the hearings.16 The original radar contacts dropped off the scope at 2134, but the crews of Maddox and Turner Joy believed they detected two high-speed contacts closing on their position at 44 knots. Such arguments are rooted in the information and documents released by Daniel Ellsberg and others, and were reinforced over the decades by anniversary interviews with some of the participants, including ships crewmen and officers. He has appeared on The History Channel as a featured expert. Vaccines. Along with other American warships, Maddox was steaming in international waters some 28 nautical miles off North Vietnams coast, gathering information on that countrys coastal radars. The first critic report from Phu Bai reached Washington at about 0740 hours, Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). In 2005 documents were released proving that Johnson had fabricated the Gulf of Tonkin incident in order to justify attacking North Vietnam. President Johnson ordered a halt to all 34A operations "to avoid sending confusing signals associated with recent events in the Gulf of Tonkin." History is a guide to navigation in perilous times. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 That very night, the idea was put to the test. Conspiracy Gulf Of Tonkin Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. AND THERE is the fact of Vietnam's position today. Alerted to the threat, Herrick requested air support from the carrier USS Ticonderoga. Tonkin Gulf Shortly after ordering the airstrikes, Johnson went on television and addressed the nation regarding the incident. Congress supported the resolution with The maximum closure distance was originally established at 20 nautical miles, but the commander of the U.S. Interview, authors with James Hawes, 31 March 1996. Media Manipulation. The Pyramid and All-Seeing Eye . In addition, the US Navy was instructed to conduct Desoto patrols off North Vietnam. A firewall existed between covert patrol-boat attacks on North Vietnamese positions and Desoto patrols eavesdropping on shore-based communications. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. The battle was over in 22 minutes. Gulf of Tonkin - National Security Agency Hickman, Kennedy. At this point, U.S. involvement in Vietnam remained largely in the background. Seeking to follow the established policy of containment, Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began increasing military aid to South Vietnam. The 522-page NSA official history Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, triggered a new round of media reporting and renewed debate about what really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin. But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. . They arrived on station overhead by 2100 hours. It still is not clear whether the order was intended to halt the attack or to delay it until after nightfall, when there was a much greater chance for success. Despite the on-scene commanders efforts to correct their errors in the initial after-action reports, administration officials focused instead on the first SIGINT reports to the exclusion of all other evidence. The NSA report is revealing. . The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. We're going to retaliate and well make an announcement a little later in the evening, in the next hour or so and well ask Congress for a resolution of war the next day to support us, Johnson toldan old friend. Gulf of Tonkin & the Vietnam War. Both orders were repeated, but only the latter was relayed to the torpedo boats before the attack was launched. By then, early news accounts had already solidified some opinions, and the Johnson Administration had decided to launch retaliatory strikes. So, whether by accident or design, American actions in the Tonkin Gulf triggered a response from the North Vietnamese, not the other way around. 4. But Morse did not know enough about the program to ask pointed questions. Ships radar detected five patrol boats, which turned out to be P-4 torpedo boats and Swatows. Lyndon Johnson on August 5, 1964, assertedly in reaction to two The Desoto patrol continued with another destroyer, the Turner Joy (DD-951), coming along to ward off further trouble. The North Vietnamese didnt buy the distinction; they attacked the USS Maddox. ." In fact, the North Vietnamese were trying to avoid contact with U.S. forces on August 4, and they saw the departure of the Desoto patrol ships as a sign that they could proceed to recover their torpedo boats and tow them back to base. 14. William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part II, 1961-1964, pp. Conspiracy FACT #8: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - YouTube $22. In this case, perception was much more important than reality.10. At the time, the Navy relied heavily on Naval Support Group Activity (NSGA), San Miguel, Philippines, for SIGINT support, augmented by seaborne SIGINT elements called Direct Support Units (DSUs). And so, in the course of a single day, and operating on imperfect information,Johnson changedthe trajectory of the Vietnam War. WebThe Senate passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution with only two opposing votes, and the House of Representatives passed it unanimously. The history stops with the U.S. Navy moving into full combat duty -- the naval and air interdictions in South and North Vietnam -- the subject of future volumes. By 1400 hours EDT, the president had approved retaliatory strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases for the next morning, August 5, at 0600 local time, which was 1900 EDT on August 4 in Washington. Whether they produced battlefield images of the dead or daguerreotype portraits of common soldiers, []. Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. Vietnam is a very watery country. In a conversation with McNamara on Aug. 3, after the first incident, Johnson indicated he hadalready thought about the political ramifications of a military response and hadconsulted with several allies. At about the same time, there were other "secret" missions going on. Despite McNamaras nimble answers, North Vietnams insistence that there was a connection between 34A and the Desoto patrols was only natural. A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. The stakes were high because Hanoi had beefed up its southern coastal defenses by adding four new Swatow gunboats at Quang Khe, a naval base 75 miles north of the DMZ, and ten more just to the south at Dong Hoi. Over the next few years, Johnson used the resolution to rapidly escalate American involvement in the Vietnam War. Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration of war. As far as the headlines were concerned, that was it, but the covert campaign continued unabated.

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